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Abstract. The advent of multi-technology networks offering the service contin-
uum over multiple network infrastructures implies new challenges to integrated 
management. One of these challenges is the auto-configuration of the manage-
ment plane needed to allow dynamic relationships among several managers and 
one management agent. This paper proposes the use of provisional policies in 
order to dynamically auto-configure the access control part of a management 
agent. This allows simple management based on agent location and time as well 
as the cooperative behavior of several managers. 
1 Introduction 
Recent advances in providing multiple services over heterogeneous networks demand 
a new approach for constructing the management plane. The management paradigms 
used in today networks are based on the manager agent model (designed in the mid 
80’) which defines a protocol for exchanging management information, specified ac-
cording to an information model and stored in a conceptual repository, called Man-
agement Information Base (MIB). 
In this approach and for the last decade, the management plane was configured in a 
static manner. For instance a basic configuration of the management protocol estab-
lished at agent boot time is always assumed to exist. Such an assumption does not 
hold any more when we are trying to manage nomadic equipment, multi-homed sites 
and dynamic service infrastructures. In this paper we address the issue of providing a 
management approach which extends the SNMPv3 framework allowing the dynamic 
configuration of the access control to MIB objects using a context specific access con-
trol. The automatic configuration of the management plane is an essential step to-
wards fully integrated management. Including self-management features within the 
management plane is important for plug and play type of management, where mini-
mal human interactions are requested. On the other hand, existing management 
frameworks should be easily extended/integrated without demanding a total concep-
tual and implementation change. Our paper is structured as follows: section 2 de-
scribes the business case and motivates our work. An introduction to provisional au-
thorizations and their usage for the configuration of the management stack is given in 
section 3. The management framework is described in section 4, while pointers to re-
lated work are given in section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper by highlighting future 
work. 
2 The Business Case for Self-Configuration of MIB Access 
This section presents two simplified business cases (see figure 1) motivating the po-
tential of the self-configuration of the management stack. In this first case, Bob own-
ing a WIFI enabled laptop uses his laptop both at home and work. While Bob is at the 
office, his laptop is under the management responsibility of the enterprise manage-
ment platform (EMP). For instance, Bob might not even be allowed to auto-
administer his laptop. However, as soon as Bob leaves the office and gets home, the 
same laptop which is connected to the home network should be considered under the 
management responsibility of the home management platform (HMP). At this mo-
ment, the enterprise management platform should not be allowed to perform any 
management operations on Bob’s laptop. An extension to the previous case consists in 
adding some additional constraints. Bob’s laptop is owned by the enterprise. If Bob is 
working at the office then his laptop is under the total control of the enterprise man-
agement applications. However, when Bob connects his laptop to his home network, 
the home network management application might perform management operations if 
and only if the enterprise network management platform approves it.  
 
Fig. 1. Simplified Business Case 
 
Looking at the two scenarios in order to abstract the fundamental requirements we 
can claim the following requirements: 
1. Management needs to be context driven. A context can be defined as the 
overall ensemble of parameters characterizing the instant connectivity. For 
instance the context can be the collection of network interfaces, their IP ad-
dresses, netmask, and the DNS used. 
2. Dynamic interactions among several managers need to be supported. It 
should be possible to a manager to approve or deny operations performed be-
tween an agent and another manager, without requiring direct manager to 
manager communication.  
 
Does the current management SNMP framework meet these requirements? The an-
swer is definitely not. For instance, the most advanced SNMP version (SNMP v3) [ 6] 
[ 17] allows to offer several views and access rights to the MIB, but these ones are de-
fined statically independent of the context. This is done using an enhanced access 
control module, also known as the View Based Access Control Model (VACM) [ 6]. 
In the case of the simple scenario presented above, using the current VACM model 
defined by SNMPv3, would imply that the EMP could perform some management 
operations even when Bob is connected from home. This is based on the assumption 
that Bob will not manually configure the VACM every time he connects to a network. 
The extended scenario (where the EMP must authorize management requests per-
formed by HMP) is definitely more complicated and can not be implemented with 
current management paradigms. In the following section we will introduce provi-
sional policies and show how an extension of the current VACM can be based on 
provisional authorizations in order to meet the requirements. Two more additional re-
quirements must be addressed: 
1. Backward compatibility with SNMP [ 5]. 
2. Whatever works right now, should also work in the future. That is, existing 
management applications should be valid and fully working. 
3 Provisional Authorizations for Dynamic Access Control to 
MIB Objects 
Provisional authorizations have been introduced in [ 7] and [ 8] as a solution towards 
additional semantics for controlling access requests. Traditional access control sys-
tems considered that access requests can be modeled as a demand to authorize a par-
ticular action (read/write/delete) made by a subject within a given context on a par-
ticular object. A provisional authorization is a generalization of this scheme, modeling 
a conditional authorization, ie, an access request is granted if and only if additional 
conditions hold. This approach can be applied at the agent side. MIB objects are enti-
ties to which read/write requests are made. Provisional authorizations are stored on 
the agent and regulate the access to the MIB objects. The provisional framework for 
management can be described as follows: 
1. The set S represents all possible subjects requesting access to objects. In our 
case, these are all managers: For instance in terms of the previously de-
scribed simple scenario { }HMPEMPS ,=  
2. The set of all possible objects is O. This corresponds to all OIDs in the MIB. 
3. A is the set of access modes permitted on objects. { }setgetA ,=   
4. There is the notion of context, c, representing time and location. The set of 
contexts is C. A particular context is given by the collection of ipad-
dress/netmask/DNS used on each network interface. In this paper, we will 
use the term context having this definition in mind. The VACM aware reader 
should not confuse this term with the one used to specify a MIB view in 
SNMPv3. 
5. A permission is either to grant or to deny access. The set of permissions is 
Perm = {grant, denied} 
6.  A set FM of formulas. An individual formula f is a logical conjunction of 
equalities and/or inequalities. For instance t>18 means current time after 
18h. An equality or inequality is constituted of constant terms (string or 
numbers) as well system accessible variables. System accessible variables 
are all variables in the MIB. Other system specific variables might also be 
presented. If a formula holds, then the authorization policy is active (see in 
the following for the definition of an authorization policy). Examples of 
formulas could be :  
• “1.3.6.1.2.1.ip.ipInAddrErrors>1000”, allowing a 
manager to get/set values in a subtree, whenever the number of 
datagrams errors due to address errors is higher than a threshold. 
While visiting a foreign network, Bob could allow management ac-
cess to his machine, if and only if it’s starting to have functioning 
errors.  
• “1.3.6.1.2.1.interfaces.ifTable.ifEntry.ifInde
x.1.ifOperStatus==”down”. This formula expresses the fact 
that the first network interface of an agent’s node does not work. For a 
multihomed node, one can use this formula to allow a manager con-
necting via the second interface to fully manage the agent if the first 
network interface is not working. As a typical business case, let us 
consider an access router with two interfaces, used by a home net-
work. Two managers do exist. The first one belongs to the Internet 
Service Provider, while the second one is used on the home network. 
Such a formula could be used to allow the home manager full control 
over the access router whenever no connection to the ISP’s manager 
is possible.  
7. A set of provisional actions PRV. A provisional action is used to add new 
semantics on an authorization policy. We provide one single extension ver-
ify, meaning that another subject agrees with this operation. For instance ver-
ify(HMP) means that HMP has to agree with a particular request in order to 
authorize this access. We can model the agreement of several managers us-
ing a list of provisional actions. Several comma separated verify clauses are 
equivalent to a conjunction of authorizations. All subjects must authorize the 
request. Semi-colon separated list of provisional actions represent the fact 
that at least one entity must authorize the request. These types of actions are 
used in situations when a subset of managers must all agree on a set of ac-
tions. The second case is used when any manager out of a subset has to au-
thorize a request.  
 
The configuration of the access control scheme is based on providing a set of au-
thorization policies :  *Pr PRVFMPermCASOAuth ××××××⊂
 An authorization policy, for instance is: 
AuthPRHMPverifytimegrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMP
∈>
===
))(,18,
),1.3.224.195,0.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,.*,1.6.3.1(
 
modeling the fact that : Manager HMP is allowed to read all elements under the sub-
tree 1.3.6.1, if the agent is connected with IP address 194.2234.3.23, netmask 
255.255.255.0 and DNS server 194.224.3.1, and current time is past 18h, provided 
that EMP agrees. 
An authorization request is a 4 tuple : CASOcasoar ×××∈= ),,,(  meaning that action 
a in context c is to be performed by s on object o. For the previous example, such a 
request might look like: 
))1.3.224.195,0.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,.*,1.6.3.1(
===
=
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMPar
 
This request models the read operation on OID starting with 1.3.6.1, performed by 
manager EMP, where the current connectivity configuration of the laptop is given by 
the address, netmask and DNS. For every authorization request, an authorization deci-
sion is computed based on the set of authorization policies. Basically, a decision is to 
either grant or deny an action. Allowing an action can be either unconditionally or 
conditionally. A conditional allow is associated to a list of provisional actions. These 
actions must be performed in order to fully allow the operation. An example based on 
the previous scenario is the following decision: 
))(,
),1.3.224.195,0.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,.*,1.6.3.1(
HMPverifygrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMPdecision
===
=
 
This decision allows the access for EMP to read all objects in the subtree 1.3.6.1, if 
the agent is on a network (ip address of the agent=194.224.3.23 with netmask 
255.255.255.0) if and only if HMP agrees.  
The provisional action can include several actions. “verify(HMP), verify(Bob)” is 
equivalent to both Bob and HMP must agree with this decision, while “ver-
ify(HMP);verify(Bob)” means that at least one of them must agree. This framework is 
a generalization of the SNMPv3 VACM architecture. However, this generalized ap-
proach allows us to model context driven and conditional management, as well as 
more advanced interactions between managers as described in the two business cases. 
Another applicability of this framework lies in providing a potential solution towards 
autonomous management. 
For the moment, we postpone the presentation of the management architecture 
needed to support this authorization framework, and focus on the semantic expres-
siveness of this model.  
Let us first see if the two described scenarios can be implemented by the model. 
Obviously, for the fist scenario, we can use the following four authorization policies: 
1.  
),
),1.3.224.152,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.152(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getEMP
===
2.  
),
),1.3.224.152,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.152(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
setEMP
===
3.  
),
),1.3.224.195,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
getHMP
===
4.  
),
),1.3.224.195,255.255.255.255,23.3.224.194(
,,(*,
nullgrant
dnsnetmaskaddresscontext
setHMP
===
Policies 1 and 2 state that the enterprise management platform in allowed to get/set 
any object in the MIB as long as Bob’s laptop is on the enterprise network. Policies 3 
and 4 model the equivalent for the home network. Obviously, dealing with dynamic 
allocated addresses is done by using wildcards in the specifications. For this scenario, 
no formulas are requested. It’s also easy to see that Bob’s terminal cannot be managed 
by his office manager, when Bob is at home. 
The second scenario, in which Bob’s enterprise manager must agree with the home 
management application, is already presented when we have introduced the provi-
sional authorizations. 
Without detailing an implementation specific verification mechanism, let us con-
sider the following authorization policy:  
))(,,*),*,*,(,,*,2.1.4.1.6.3.1( Bobverifynullgrantdnsnetmaskaddresscontextread ===  
This policy models the fact that Bob must be asked by the management agent when-
ever a get request is made on the subtree 1.3.6.1.4.1.2. Such flexibility is interesting in 
the management of mobile devices, in which users could be prompted to explicitly au-
thorize operations performed on their terminals (like for instance reading their con-
figuration/agenda by a foreign management application). It could be considered as an 
user-interactive SNMP agent. 
Finally, it’s natural to ask if such an authorization policy based approach can be used 
for total self management. Without pretending to have a clear definition of total self 
management, we argue that at least it might give you illusion of self management. 
Imagine the very simple case of one authorization policy:  
))(,,*),*,*,((*,*,*, managerverifynullgrantdnsnetmaskaddresscontext ===  
The intelligence or auto-configuration feature is actually hidden by the existence of 
a manager who authorizes every request. An agent using such a policy can be easily 
plugged into any network and provide the illusion of being auto-configurable. The 
auto-configuration in this case is actually outsourced and delegated. This is obviously 
an extreme case, having a lot of overhead in terms of management communication, 
but it shows that provided the existence of an authorization manager and a convenient 
set of authorization policies, a relative degree of autonomy can be achieved. Such a 
mechanism is very useful for the management of nomadic equipment. The manage-
ment platform to which the equipment belongs can specify limited management op-
erations allowed whenever the equipment is not on the home network and might agree 
to extended management provided it is consulted. As far as we know, no previous 
management framework is capable of similar features.  
4 Implementation Framework 
This section describes the management framework based on the authorization poli-
cies. One of the requirements was not to depend on a new management protocol. Tak-
ing SNMPv3 as a major building block, our approach consists in providing a new Ac-
cess Control subsystem and an optional extension within an SNMP agent. Figure 2 
(adapted from [ 6], [ 19]) shows where the new access control subsystem and the op-
tional extension fit into the block functional architecture of an SNMP agent. One is-
sue that was not addressed in this paper yet relates to the dynamic interactions among 
an agent and one or several managers. The issue is how do managers and agents dis-
cover reciprocally, and how to provide a security model for such a framework.  
The existing security model defined in SNMPv3 is implemented in the USM (User 
Security Model) [ 18] allowing the authentication of the manager as well as the op-
tional privacy of the communication. For the authentication and privacy, two secret 
keys are shared between the agent and the manager. The first one is used to authenti-
cate the manager, while the second one is used to encrypt/decrypt the SNMP opera-
tions. While the existence of these two keys can be assumed by an off-line exchange 
among the managers, we consider that full autonomy for the management plane is 
based on a dynamical manager to agent secret key exchange. Figure 2 shows two ad-
ditional components and their interactions. The first one is a Manager Discoverer. Its 
main functionality is to discover network managers. Several choices are possible: 
1. The manager learns through topology monitoring/DHCP the existence of a 
new node, and checking UDP port 161 on the node, discovers the agent. 
2. The address of the manager is included in an extension of the DHCP configu-
ration  10. An IETF proposition [ 15] suggests the use of DHCP to detect a list 
of IP addresses to which notifications have to be sent. 
3. The agent uses the DNS to look for a manager located in the same domain 
4. A management service containing the description of the manager location is 
advertised over SAP (Session Announcement Protocol) [ 12] 
5. The agent discovers via the Service Location Protocol (SLP) [ 11] the manager.  
The information about the manager contains also a public key Public(M) on which the 
latter is listening. The manager uses the RSA (Rivest, Shamir, Adleman algorithm) 
[ 13] with the public key Public(M) and an associated private key Private(M).  
As soon as a new manager is discovered, two secret keys authk, privk are generated 
by the agent and stored in the MIB of the agent. Although, the existing SNMPv3 
standard discourages the storing of secret keys in the MIB, we consider that proper 
access control performed by the agent can assure the required security. The Manager 
obtains the two keys by issuing a Get Request. This Request must be encapsulated in 
a SNMPv3 packet having msgSecurityModel equal to 4. This field describes the secu-
rity model to be used by the agent. Normally, 1 is used for SNMPv1, 2, SNMPv3 uses 
the value of 3 and SNMPv2c uses 2 [ 6]. 
The value 4 corresponds to our PK security model. This PK security model checks 
the authenticity of the issued requester using the manager’s public key Public(M). In 
fact, our extension provides a possible public key exchange facility to a SNMPv3 
agent. The assumption is here, that the manager discovery process detects a genuine 
trusted service. 
If authentication is valid (this process is based on the fact that only the legitimate 
manager has the key used for encryption: Private(M)), the two keys (authk, privk) are 
sent to the manager. The response is encrypted using the public key of the manager: 
Public(M).  
The next following interactions between the manager and the agent are performed 
using the traditional security model (msgSecurityModel=3), which is based on 
symmetric keys (authk, privk) and therefore more efficient.  
The second extension consists in a new Access control subsystem, which is used 
by a SNMP engine to check that particular request is authorized. 
 
 
Fig. 2.  SNMP agent architecture 
 
A functional block decomposition of the Authorization based Access control is shown 
in figure 3. 
Authorization Policies are stored in a Policy store. This store is implementation 
specific. A policy management console pushes authorization on this store. This con-
figuration can be either based on SNMP, similar to the VACM configuration in 
SNMP3. In this case an extended MIB containing tables corresponding to the formu-
las and the provisional actions are needed. Note, that for the address and netmask 
variables used in the context, the existing MIB2 entries can be used. 
Another configuration of these policies can be done using COPS-PR [ 4]. One of 
the advantages of COPS-PR lies in its working over TCP. If the self-management ca-
pable agent is connected to a distinct network then the one containing the policy con-
sole, most firewalls will drop SNMP traffic, leaving however TCP connections origi-
nating from the agent.  
The Policy Validator is responsible to check the coherence of deployed policies. Its 
main objective is to resolve conflicting authorizations. 
A Request Processor is the entity where an access request is made. The request proc-
essor uses the policy store and computes the authorization decision. If access is either 
granted without any provisional actions, or denied, this decision is returned to the 
SNMP engine. 
To summarize, authorization policies are configured in the Policy Access Control 
module of the SNMP engine. When such a policy is triggered, an authorization might 
be requested from an authorization manager. This request can be implemented via 
COPS, in which a explicit accept decision is requested from a PDP. Therefore, the 
concept of policy is twofold. We have authorization policies regulating the access 
rights to the SNMP agent and we have authorization requests and replies triggered by 
an authorization policy.  
 
Fig. 3.  Functional Architecture of the Access Control Subsystem 
One interesting example consists in a management approach for a multi-homed 
host. This case, (shown in figure 4) assumes that both managers trust a third manager 
T. The latter is responsible to assure that requests issued by one manager do not al-
ter/expose sensible management information. For requests issued to particular OIDs, 
T must explicitly approve them. The assumption that a common trusted manager ex-
ists might be relatively optimistic. If this assumption does not hold, both A and B 
should be asked to allow these requests. This can be expressed in a provisional action 
might be “verify(A), verify(B)”. This means, that both manager have to approve this 
request. Obviously, this implies an overhead, but provides a solution for either not 
disclosing A’s confidential monitoring information to B, or allowing B to configure 
A’s related entities.  
 
 
 
Fig. 4. Management of a Multi-homed host 
 
To see the usage of COPS for authorization checking, assume that A issues a Set 
on a OID and that the Control Subsystem decides to grant it, provided T confirms. 
The Control subsystem issues a COPS Request Message [ 3] to T. The COPS-
context in this message is set to “Set”, (it would have been “Get” for a Get Request). 
Additional COPS-type objects in this message, called ClientSI (client specific infor-
mation object) represent the OIDs and the snmpEngineId of the requester. 
If T decides that the request is granted, it replies with a COPS-Decision having a 
command INSTALL. From now one, whenever A issues the same request, (within the 
same context and formulas still holding), this is granted by the agent. If after some 
time, T issues a Remove Decision, the grant decision of the agent, must be re-
confirmed as previously explained.  
5 Related Work 
We started our work based on the general management agent security configuration 
proposed in the SNMPv3 [ 6], [ 19] specifications. The View Access Control Model 
[ 17] allows the definition of view and allowed operations for a set of managers. Its 
user security model USM [ 18] provides the supporting mechanisms for manager-
agent privacy and authentication. These mechanisms must be configured statically 
and are difficult if management of nomadic or multi-homed equipments has to be per-
formed. These approaches are extended by our work with context driven and condi-
tional management as well as a security model configurable dynamically. One of the 
first initiative towards simplified and automatic host configuration was started by the 
zero-configuration group at the IETF [ 9], where individual (private network) ad-
dresses are automatically assigned without requesting static configuration or DHCP 
[ 10] support. Policy based network management has been applied for QoS manage-
ment in both Diffserv as well as Intserv [ 1] types of networks, without however ad-
dressing the self-management issue. A policy based approach for the auto-
configuration of networks is proposed in the Nestor [ 14] platform used to manage an 
active network platform. Change operations are managed via policy rules and inte-
grated within a larger network self configurability architecture. The research commu-
nity working in access control mechanisms proposed a large variety of security archi-
tectures and policy specification methods. However, no direct applications towards 
extending the management functionality based on these concepts have been proposed. 
Our approach is different with respect to the previously mentioned work in several 
aspects. We start with the main objective to use SNMPv3 the standard management 
protocol in an autonomic way. We propose a novel architecture for an SNMP agent 
capable to integrate within existing deployed networks and without requiring a com-
plex additional infrastructure at the network site. We have not yet decided to use a 
specific policy specification framework. Our current prototype uses a proprietary so-
lution. We are looking into applying the PONDER specification framework [ 16] for 
this purpose. PONDER provides an extremely powerful language which could be ca-
pable to express management authorizations as well as context related information. 
6 Conclusions 
We addressed in this paper the issue of flexible network management, respectively 
self-management. We started with the observation that current standardized network 
management frameworks do not offer enough support for enhanced agent autonomy. 
The simple observation is that an already configured SNMPv3 agent, taken out from 
his home network and put under the management control of one or several foreign 
management applications without any additional human interaction is not functional. 
This is due to several factors. Firstly, a fixed security Model (USM) and a fixed Ac-
cess Module (VACM) are incapable to configure on their own. A second factor, 
which is more conceptual, is related to the existing management paradigm, in which a 
manager interacts directly with an agent. We extend this paradigm by allowing other 
parties (managers) to express their agreement within such an interaction. We provide 
a framework allowing context/location driven management and conditional manage-
ment. We argue that current SNMPv3 specifications provide an excellent authoriza-
tion and access control mechanism for a fixed environment. This is the case with most 
existing target environments. However, nomadic environments where more and more 
users are mobile require new management frameworks. We addressed this issue by 
assuming the standard management protocol SNMPv3 and we proposed an extension 
of the SNMPv3 management framework. A new security model and an access control 
are proposed. The proposed security model allows the exchange of the authentication 
and privacy keys. These keys are used by the SNMPv3 user security model. Our man-
agement framework is based on authorization policies and provisional actions in 
which context driven management can be performed. The context is defined by the 
network connectivity properties used on the managed equipment site. Our approach 
generalizes the View based Access Control subsystem proposed in the SNMPv3 ar-
chitecture, without requiring changes at the SNMP protocol level. Thus, our extension 
is transparent for already existing management applications. Existing management 
agents should be easily modified in order to enable dynamic access control to MIB 
objects. We consider that self-management is strongly related to the auto-
configuration of the management plane. Management of mobile devices as well as 
environments where multiple management applications interact dynamically are the 
primary immediate business targets. Our approach is based on managing the man-
agement stack within a policy based solution. This integration shows also the com-
plementary nature of these two types of management and motivates the necessity of 
having both of them within a single management stack. We are currently implement-
ing the proposed architecture within a Net-SNMP framework. It will be validated 
within our IPv6 testbed. 
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